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Internal Audit Involvement in Enterprise Risk Management  
 
Abstract 
Purpose - The paper examines the impact of internal auditors’ involvement in Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM) on perceptions of their willingness to report a breakdown in 
risk procedures and whether a strong relationship with the audit committee affects such 
willingness to report. The study also investigates the use of ERM and the role of internal 
audit in ERM in Australian private and public sector entities.  
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses an experimental design, manipulating 
(i) the internal auditor’s involvement in ERM and (ii) the strength of the relationship 
between internal audit and the audit committee. Participants are 117 certified internal 
auditors. The study also gathers descriptive data on the use of ERM. 
Findings - The study indicates that a high involvement in ERM impacts the perceptions 
of internal auditors’ willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures to the audit 
committee. However, a strong relationship with the audit committee does not appear to 
affect their perceived willingness to report. The study also finds that the majority of 
organisations have recently adopted ERM. Internal auditors are involved in ERM 
assurance activities but some also engage in activities that could compromise objectivity. 
Research limitations – There are internal and external validity threats associated with 
the experimental design. 
Practical implications – The findings reinforce the need for organisations to adhere to 
the recommendations of the IIA and to ensure that internal auditors do not play an 
inappropriate role in ERM. 
Originality/value – The study contributes to our understanding of the impact of 
involvement in ERM on internal audit objectivity and of the current role of internal audit 
in ERM in Australia. 
  
Keywords  Internal auditing; enterprise risk management; audit committees. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1999, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) revised the definition of internal 
auditing to include both assurance and consulting activities across the three related areas 
of risk management, control and governance (IIA, 2009). Five years later, the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) released its 
integrated framework for Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) (COSO, 2004). Since 
then, there has been a global move towards an enterprise wide approach to risk 
management, with internal auditors playing a key role in providing both assurance and 
consulting services with respect to the management of risk within their organisations 
(Sarens and De Beelde, 2006).  
While internal audit engagement in ERM can add value to the organisation, there 
is also a risk that it could lead to a compromise of independence and objectivity. 
Recognising this possibility, the IIA issued a position paper delineating the core roles of 
internal audit in regard to ERM, the roles that internal audit can legitimately undertake 
providing safeguards are in place, and roles that internal audit should not undertake (IIA, 
2004a). 
The increased involvement of internal audit in ERM and the concerns that this 
involvement could pose a threat to internal audit objectivity provide the key motivations 
for this study. The objectives of the study are twofold. First, we examine internal 
auditors’ perceptions of the impact of involvement in ERM on internal auditors’ 
willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures to the audit committee and whether 
a strong relationship between internal audit and the audit committee affects such 
willingness to report. Second, we provide descriptive evidence of the extent to which 
organisations in Australia have implemented ERM, together with the ERM activities in 
which internal audit participates.  In this respect, the study provides a comparison with 
the findings of an IIA Research Foundation study reported in Gramling and Myers (2006) 
(hereafter GM).  To achieve these objectives, we survey Certified Internal Auditors in 
Australia, using a questionnaire containing a research experiment supplemented by 
additional questions on the use of ERM and the role of internal audit in ERM.  
Our study indicates that internal auditors perceive that a high involvement in 
ERM impacts on internal auditors’ willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures 
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to the audit committee.  However, a strong relationship with the audit committee does not 
appear to affect the likelihood of reporting, regardless of the level of ERM involvement. 
We also find that the majority of organisations are using ERM, with most having adopted 
it recently. The majority of internal auditors are involved in core activities such as giving 
assurance on risk management while a small number indicated that they engage in 
activities that the IIA recommends should not be undertaken.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides the 
background to the study and develops hypotheses and research questions. The research 
method and results are presented in the subsequent sections. In the final section, some 
conclusions are drawn, the limitations of the study are acknowledged and suggestions for 
further research are provided.  
 
Background, Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 
ERM is defined by COSO (2004, 2) as: 
“…a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management 
and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives.”  
When announcing the release of the COSO framework, the IIA issued a statement 
commenting on the internal auditor’s role in risk management (IIA, 2004b). The 
following extract from that statement confirms that the IIA supports an active role for 
internal auditors in ERM, including making recommendations to improve the 
organisation’s risk processes.   
“Internal auditors should assist both management and the audit 
committee in their risk management responsibilities and oversight 
roles by examining, evaluating, reporting, and recommending 
improvements on the adequacy and effectiveness of management’s 
risk processes.”  
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While advocating both an assurance and consultancy role for internal audit with 
respect to ERM, the IIA is also very conscious of the potential threat to objectivity and 
independence.  As noted, the position paper on the role of internal audit in ERM (IIA, 
2004a) outlined three categories of ERM roles: (i) the recommended or core roles of 
internal audit in ERM, (ii) the roles that are perceived as legitimate provided they are 
undertaken with safeguards, and (iii) the roles that should not be undertaken. The specific 
roles under each category are listed in Table I. In the present study, high involvement is 
defined as a situation in which an internal auditor is extensively involved in all three 
categories of ERM activities as identified by the IIA, while low involvement is regarded 
as minimal involvement in only those activities that are regarded as core to internal 
auditors. 
Insert Table I about here   
In 2005, the IIA Research Foundation conducted a global online survey[1] with 
internal auditors regarding their involvement in ERM (GM). The survey found that 
internal audit was primarily responsible for ERM in 36% of the organisations surveyed. 
Further, the study also found that some internal auditors were engaged in roles that the 
IIA had recommended as being unsuitable. A recent study conducted by Fraser and 
Henry (2007) in the United Kingdom found that internal audit can be heavily involved in 
ERM. This study consisted of interviews with financial directors, audit committee chairs, 
internal auditors and risk directors of five listed companies as well as four audit partners 
from the “Big Four” audit firms.  The authors also found evidence of internal auditors 
having responsibility for ERM practices, despite both COSO and the IIA position paper 
stating such responsibility must rest with management. In general, these studies show that 
internal auditors, in some cases, are involved in ERM activities that have been deemed 
unsuitable by the IIA, thus signalling a high risk for loss of internal auditor objectivity. 
Engaging in consulting activities associated with ERM raises significant threats to 
objectivity in the forms of self-review, social pressure and familiarity (Brody and Lowe, 
2000; Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004; Plumlee, 1985). ERM activities that involve decision 
making by an internal auditor such as setting the risk appetite and taking decisions on risk 
procedure set-ups, are likely to entail considerable risk of self-review. For example, in 
Fraser and Henry’s (2007) study an internal auditor was quoted as saying, “I came in and 
implemented a business risk management system, a sort of toolkit that people could 
actually use, and installed reporting and understanding throughout the group” (Fraser and 
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Henry, 2007, p. 403). Fraser and Henry (2007) warn that such approaches may in fact 
raise independence issues. In addition, high involvement in ERM activities and 
particularly in decision making can lead to auditors becoming very familiar with ERM 
staff. For example, Fern (1985, p. 32), in an earlier study on internal auditor familiarity 
with auditees, points out that “an unconscious erosion of objectivity could occur as the 
auditor’s questioning attitude is placated through over familiarity with activity and/or 
with the person involved.”  Working closely with management can also give rise to social 
pressure threats, as internal auditors are cognisant of management’s desire for their work 
to add value to the organisation.   
Based on the above discussion, we thus argue that a high level of internal audit 
involvement in ERM activities, including those roles that the IIA states should not be 
undertaken, poses a threat to internal auditor objectivity. In the context of the present 
study, this means that internal auditors would be less willing to report a breakdown in 
risk procedures to the audit committee when they have been heavily involved in ERM 
compared to when their involvement is lower. Thus, the first hypothesis tested in the 
experimental part of this study is as follows: 
H1: Perceptions of internal auditors’ willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures 
to the audit committee will be lower when they have a high level of involvement in ERM 
compared to when they have a low level of involvement in ERM. 
An interesting issue is whether internal auditors’ relationship with the audit 
committee has any bearing on their willingness to report to the committee. In the context 
of the present study, there are two situations that must be considered. First, when internal 
auditors have not been directly involved in implementing risk procedures, advising the 
audit committee of a breakdown in procedures involves reporting adversely on one’s 
peers (i.e. the risk management staff). Second, when internal auditors have been heavily 
involved in implementing risk procedures, reporting any breakdown to the audit 
committee involves an admission of weaknesses in their own performance. We argue that 
these two scenarios have the potential to drive somewhat different behaviours.   
In the first scenario, we expect that internal auditors will be more willing to report 
adversely on their peers when they have a strong relationship with an effective audit 
committee. This is because the role of audit committees is to support the internal audit 
function, ensuring that internal auditors have the necessary status and resources to remain 
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objective (Bailey, 2007). For instance, Principle 4 of the ASX’s Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (2007) states that the audit committee should assess the 
performance and objectivity of the internal audit function, while Principle 7 states that 
the audit committee and internal audit should have direct access to each other.  
Gul and Subramaniam (1994) provide some empirical support for internal 
auditors’ ability to resist management pressure in situations when an audit committee is 
present. A direct reporting line with the audit committee is considered to improve the 
status of internal audit (Adamec et al., 2005) and to remove the possibility of a social 
pressure threat when internal audit is required to report to management (Blue Ribbon 
Committee, 1999; Cohen et al., 2004).  Furthermore, Adamec et al. (1999, p. 45) argue 
that it is not sufficient to merely have a direct reporting line between internal audit and 
the audit committee. Rather, the relationship between the two parties must have 
‘substance’. The authors list four indicators that would signify whether the relationship 
has substance: the audit committee has the authority to hire, fire and compensate the chief 
internal auditor; the committee approves internal audit’s budget and scope; the committee 
has frequent and private meetings with internal audit; and the committee approves any 
internal audit support work (Adamec et al., 1999). Bailey (2007) likewise argues that, in 
situations where the audit committee has authority to hire, fire and compensate the chief 
internal auditor, internal auditors will have less fear of retaliation when reporting on 
negative management behaviour.  
Based on the above discussion, we argue that internal auditors will be more likely 
to withstand pressure from other managers to compromise their objectivity when they 
have a strong and close relationship with an effective audit committee. Hence, in the 
situation where internal auditors have low involvement in ERM, we expect that they will 
be more willing to report a breakdown in risk procedures involving their peers when their 
relationship with the audit committee is strong.  
The second scenario involves an admission of weakness in one’s own 
performance.  We would expect that internal auditors will be reluctant to report a 
breakdown in risk procedures for which they are personally responsible because this 
could damage their reputation and negatively impact the evaluation of their performance 
(Stefaniak, 2009; Donnelly et al., 2003; Larrick, 1993; Messier and Quilliam, 1992; 
McNair, 1991). However, a close relationship with the audit committee may give the 
internal auditor greater confidence that he/she would be treated fairly by the audit 
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committee because of the trust that has been built up over time.  Hence, we argue that 
internal auditors will be more willing to report a breakdown in risk procedures for which 
they are responsible when they have a close relationship with the audit committee but 
that this willingness to report will not be as strong as for the situation where they are not 
responsible for the breakdown. Hence we predict an interaction effect between the 
internal auditor’s involvement in ERM and his/her relationship with the audit committee.  
The above discussion leads to the second and third hypotheses for this study: 
H2: Perceptions of internal auditors’ willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures 
to the audit committee will be higher when there is a strong internal audit-audit 
committee relationship compared to when the relationship is weaker.  
H3: The negative association between perceptions of internal auditors’ willingness to 
report a breakdown in risk procedures and the level of internal auditors’ involvement in 
ERM will be greater when  the strength of the internal audit-audit committee relationship 
is high compared to when it is low. 
To replicate in an Australian setting the IIA Research Foundation study reported 
in GM, we also pose the following three research questions: 
RQ1: To what extent is ERM used in respondents’ organisations? 
RQ2:  What is the current responsibility of internal audit for (i) the recommended or core 
roles of internal audit in ERM, (ii) the roles that are perceived as legitimate provided they 
are undertaken with safeguards, and (iii) the roles that should not be undertaken? 
RQ3:  What is the perceived ideal responsibility of internal audit for (i) the recommended 
or core roles of internal audit in ERM, (ii) the roles that are perceived as legitimate 
provided they are undertaken with safeguards, and (iii) the roles that should not be 
undertaken? 
 
Research Method 
Participants 
The participants for the study were sourced from the Institute of Internal Auditors 
Australia (IIAA). The target group was the population of members who were registered 
as Certified Internal Auditors within Australia. A total of three hundred members 
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matched these criteria and the instruments were distributed to them through the IIAA. Of 
the 300 questionnaires distributed, a total of 117 were received, yielding a response rate 
of 39%. Descriptive statistics for the participants are presented in Table II. Over half of 
the participants (64%) are over 46 years of age. The mean number of years as an internal 
auditor is 12.59 (SD = 7.59), with approximately 68% of participants having between 
five and 20 years internal audit experience. The mean number of years as a member of 
the IIAA is also high at 9.33 years (SD = 6.70). This indicates that the participants are 
generally experienced internal auditors. Further, over 88% of the participants have prior 
managerial experience. There is also a somewhat larger representation from the public 
sector (58%) than the private sector (42%). 
Insert Table II about here 
Questionnaire design and administration 
The questionnaire comprised four sections. The first section contained the 
research experiment used to test Hypotheses 1 to 3. The second section contained 
questions designed to answer Research Questions 1 to 3. The third section contained 
biographical questions about the respondents’ background. The fourth section contained 
some questions about respondents’ audit committees.[2] 
The questionnaire was distributed with a covering letter, a reply paid envelope 
and a letter from the IIAA endorsing the study and requesting participation. After two 
weeks from the first mail-out, the IIAA sent a reminder email. Independent-samples t-
tests were conducted between early and late respondents for both the dependent variables 
and these tests indicated that there was no significant difference between the two groups. 
Late respondents were classified as those responses that were received after the return-by 
date included in the covering letter. 
 
Experimental Design 
To test the hypotheses, we use a 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design, 
resulting in four cases. The two independent variables are the extent of the internal 
auditor’s involvement in ERM (manipulated as high or low) and the strength of the 
relationship between the audit committee and internal audit (manipulated as stronger or 
weaker).  
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Task 
The case scenarios involved a hypothetical company, Alpha Ltd, which was 
portrayed as a large publicly listed construction firm with moderate profitability and 
medium risk. The aim was to create a company that was stable and unlikely to influence 
the respondents’ decisions regarding the manipulated variables.  
Further, information was also provided about Alpha Ltd’s board of directors and 
its external auditor. The board was designed to be strong in terms of composition, 
independence, diligence, and experience (Sharma et al., 2006). The external auditor was 
described as being from a top-tier firm to denote quality (Francis, 2004). It was also 
specified that the auditor had held the position for seven years to indicate experience with 
the company (Meyers et al., 2003). Finally, although there is little evidence to suggest 
that non-audit services (NAS) impair independence, it was specified that the audit firm 
did not provide NAS in order to maintain the appearance of independence (Francis, 
2004). 
  In addition, information was supplied about the internal audit department of 
Alpha Ltd. The department was designed to be reasonably strong with an experienced 
chief internal auditor and qualified staff. It was specified that internal audit’s involvement 
in ERM is to regularly review and provide assurance on the management of key risks. 
However, it was also stated that the oversight of ERM was the responsibility of the audit 
committee. 
The scenario then depicted the chief internal auditor’s involvement in the 
company’s ERM implementation and the subsequent discovery by one of the internal 
audit staff of a breakdown in the ERM procedures. The breakdown was listed as being in 
the contract specification area and of a non-financial nature, as this would be less likely 
to be discovered by the external auditors. Despite its non-financial nature, the breakdown 
was specified as serious, with long-term ramifications. This was designed to show the 
importance of reporting the breakdown, whilst still allowing for a time delay in its 
discovery that could provide the opportunity to avoid reporting it. The scenario indicated 
that it was the chief internal auditor’s responsibility to report the breakdown to the audit 
committee. It was also revealed that the breakdown could affect the performance 
assessment of those involved.  
 10
 
Independent variables 
The first independent variable, the level of internal auditor involvement in ERM, 
was manipulated at either a high or low level. The low involvement treatment included 
only those activities that the IIA considers core for internal auditors working in ERM 
(IIA, 2004a), while the high involvement treatment included activities and roles that the 
IIA deems as core as well as those deemed as a threat to objectivity (IIA, 2004a). For 
example, the internal auditor was specified as being the champion of the establishment of 
ERM, a legitimate role, but was also portrayed as taking decisions on risk responses and 
imposing risk management procedures, both of which are roles that should not be 
undertaken. The wording for the two treatments is provided in the Appendix. 
The second independent variable, pertaining to audit committee characteristics 
and relationship with internal audit, was manipulated at stronger and weaker levels. We 
define the internal audit-audit committee relationship as strong when (i) audit committee 
composition and diligence suggest that the committee is effective (DeZoort et al., 2002) 
and (ii) the committee is actively engaged with internal audit activities including 
oversight of internal audit plans and reports. A weaker relationship is deemed to exist 
when (i) the audit committee meets minimum regulatory requirements with respect to 
composition and diligence, and (ii) its engagement with the internal audit function 
including oversight of internal audit plans and reports is limited or negligible. Again, the 
wording of the two treatments is given in the Appendix. 
 
Dependent variable 
Participants were asked to rate their perceptions of whether Alpha’s chief internal 
auditor, Tim, would prepare a special report of the breakdown to be presented to the audit 
committee as required by company policy. The alternative course of action was that Tim 
would not prepare a special report but would quietly rectify the risk procedures. A nine-
point scale was provided with 1 =‘Highly Unlikely’ that Tim would report to the audit 
committee and 9 =‘Highly Likely” that he would do so. Hence, the higher the score, the 
greater is the perception that the internal auditor would remain objective.  
It should be noted that participants were asked to indicate what the company’s 
internal auditor would do rather than what they themselves would do in the situation. 
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When questions are of a sensitive nature, framing the question in this manner provides a 
more reliable measure of what the respondent actually believes (O’Leary and Stewart, 
2007; Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993).  
 
Additional questions 
To answer the first research question, participants were asked to indicate the 
status of ERM in their organisation. To address the second research question, respondents 
were asked about the current responsibility of internal audit in their organisation for each 
of the ERM activities listed in Table I. For the third research question, respondents were 
asked to indicate what they perceive to be the ideal responsibility of internal audit with 
respect to these ERM activities. A five-point scale ranging from No Responsibility to 
Total Responsibility was used for both current and ideal responsibility. 
 
Results of Experiment 
 Manipulation checks and tests for confounding variables 
Manipulation checks were carried out for both the independent variables. For 
involvement in ERM, two questions were asked. The first required participants to rate the 
internal auditor’s influence on the risk officer’s decisions while the second required 
participants to rate their perception of the extent of internal audit involvement in ERM. 
For both questions, a nine-point scale was adopted with 1 = very low 
influence/involvement and 9 = very high influence/involvement. Hence, participants who 
received the high ERM involvement version were expected to score higher than those 
receiving the low ERM involvement version. The results of t-tests are presented in Panel 
A of Table III. For both questions, the mean responses for the high and low treatments 
are significantly different (p = .001) in the expected direction, thus indicating that the 
manipulation was successful.  
Insert Table III about here 
 
Two questions were also asked to check the audit committee manipulation. 
Participants were asked to rate the strength of the audit committee and its oversight 
ability, again using a nine-point scale. For the manipulations to be deemed effective, the 
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mean responses for both questions are expected to be higher for the group receiving the 
strong audit committee scenario than for that receiving the weaker audit committee 
scenario. The results of the t-tests are shown in Panel B of Table III. The test results 
reveal that the manipulations were successful, with respondents in the strong audit 
committee group indicating significantly higher mean scores on both their perceptions of 
audit committee strength and the level of oversight ability of the audit committee (p = 
.001).  
An additional question was asked to establish if there were differences in the 
perceived likelihood that the audit committee would detect the breakdown in risk 
procedures between the stronger and weaker audit committee groups. Once again, a nine-
point scale was used with 1 = Very low likelihood, and 9 = Very high likelihood. 
Interestingly, there was no significant difference in the mean responses to this question, 
with the means for the two groups both being quite low (3.83 and 3.32 for the stronger 
and weaker audit committee groups respectively).  This result suggests that participants 
perceived that the audit committee would be unlikely to detect the breakdown in risk 
procedures, presumably because of the non-financial nature of the breakdown.  This 
strengthens the need for the chief internal auditor to behave in an objective manner and 
be willing to report the breakdown to the committee.   
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) and covariance (ANCOVA) were also conducted 
to test for the possibility of confounding effects arising from participants’ background 
and experience. None of these variables were found to have a confounding effect on the 
experimental results. 
 
Hypotheses testing 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that internal auditors will be less willing to report a 
breakdown in risk procedures to the audit committee when they are heavily involved in 
ERM compared to when they have low involvement in ERM.  Hypothesis 2 predicts that 
internal auditors will be more willing to report a breakdown to the audit committee when 
the internal audit-audit committee relationship is strong compared to when the 
relationship is weaker. Further, hypothesis 3 tests whether there is a significant 
interaction between the two variables so that the willingness to report when there is a 
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strong relationship with the audit committee is greater when the internal auditor has a low 
level of involvement in ERM compared to a high level of involvement.[3] 
The dependent variable examines the perceived likelihood of the chief internal 
auditor reporting the breakdown in ERM procedures to the audit committee. The 
descriptive statistics for this variable are presented in Panel A of Table IV which shows 
that the overall mean responses are in the direction predicted by the hypotheses. The 
mean score for the high ERM involvement group (7.19) is greater than that for the low 
involvement group (5.17). Similarly, the mean score for the strong internal audit-audit 
committee relationship group (6.43) is greater than that for the weaker relationship 
treatment (6.08).   However, results are mixed for the four experimental manipulations. 
As expected, the lowest mean occurs when ERM involvement is high and the internal 
audit-audit committee relationship is weaker. However, the highest mean occurs in the 
low ERM involvement/weaker internal audit-audit committee relationship condition. This 
is contrary to expectations with respect to the audit committee.  
 
Insert Table IV about here 
 
A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the hypotheses. 
Prior to interpreting the results of the ANOVA, homogeneity of variance was tested using 
Levene’s test of equality of error variances. The statistic was significant, indicating that 
the assumption was violated. Consequently, data transformation was adopted to correct 
for the heterogeneity of the data (Berenson et al., 2006). All original responses for the 
dependent variable were squared, resulting in a new variable. A re-run of the ANOVA 
using this variable upheld the homogeneity of variance assumption and provided 
qualitatively similar results to the non-transformed model.  Hence, only the ANOVA 
results for the transformed model are reported in Panel B of Table IV.  
The analysis shows a significant main effect for the level of ERM involvement at 
p = .001. As discussed above, given that the mean score for the likelihood of disclosure 
of the breakdown in risk procedures is higher for the high ERM involvement group (7.19) 
than for the low involvement group (5.17), this result suggests that internal auditors 
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perceive high involvement in ERM is likely to impair professional objectivity. Thus, 
there is strong support for Hypothesis 1. In contrast, no significant effect is found for the 
internal audit-audit committee relationship and hence Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Further, the interaction effect between the two independent variables is not significant, 
providing no support for Hypothesis 3. Contrary to our expectations, therefore, the 
relationship between internal audit and the audit committee does not impact on 
perceptions of the internal auditor’s willingness to report to the committee.  In providing 
an explanation for this lack of a finding, we acknowledge that our audit committee 
variable is a complex one. Prior studies have found that audit committees comprising 
independent members and members with financial expertise tend to have a greater level 
of interaction with internal audit (Scarbrough et al., 1998; Raghunandan et al., 2001; 
Goodwin, 2003; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001).  Hence, to be realistic, we manipulated both 
audit committee composition and the committee’s relationship with internal audit. It is 
possible that the audit committee composition manipulation had a confounding effect on 
our results, as it could be that participants were concerned that a strong audit committee 
would be less tolerant of the internal auditor’s lack of performance than a weaker audit 
committee, thereby cancelling out the benefit of a closer relationship between the two 
parties. We believe that this outcome is unlikely given that a weaker audit committee 
would defer to management so the internal auditor would not avoid being held 
accountable.  However, we acknowledge the possibility of a confounding effect and 
hence the need for additional research to address this concern.   
Another possible explanation for the lack of significance of the audit committee 
variable is that 58% of our respondents are from the public sector where audit 
committees tend to be larger and comprised of less independent members (Goodwin, 
2003) Although tests did not indicate a significance difference in responses across the 
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two sectors, it is possible that some public sector participants were less sensitive to the 
composition of the audit committee compared to their private sector counterparts. Again, 
further research is needed to explore sector differences in greater depth. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
The ANOVA results were checked for robustness under three specific conditions. 
Firstly, respondents with little or no involvement in ERM were excluded from the 
analysis as they could have difficulty assessing the manipulation. For the second analysis, 
respondents with low internal audit experience (i.e. those who had been an internal 
auditor for less than three years) were deleted, The third and final analysis entailed 
deletion of respondents who had never held a prior management position. For each of 
these tests, the main effect for ERM involvement was significant while the audit 
committee variable and the interaction effect were not significant. Hence, the sensitivity 
analysis indicates that our reported results are robust.   
 
Descriptive Results 
Organisational ERM Status 
To address the three research questions, Part B of the questionnaire required 
respondents to provide details on ERM practices within their organisation, and also on 
what they believe their responsibility in ERM should be. This section of the study was 
designed to be comparable with that of GM and the results are presented in comparison to 
the results of their study. The GM study is based on data collected in late 2005 while the 
present study is based on data that was collected two years later in 2007.   
The first question required respondents to indicate the status of ERM within their 
organisation. The responses to this question are presented in Table V. The results show 
that only 10% of organisations have not yet considered adopting ERM, compared to 13% 
in the GM study. Approximately 13% of organisations are still considering the adoption 
of ERM, compared to almost 32% in the GM study. More than 75% of organisations 
have adopted ERM, although in most of these cases adoption is relatively recent and full 
implementation is incomplete. This compares to 48% adoption in the GM study. 
Interestingly, none of the respondents in the present study indicated that ERM had been 
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rejected by their organisation, compared to five organisations in the GM study.  Overall, 
we can conclude in response to Research Question 1 that most organisations in our 
sample have either adopted ERM or are making progress towards adopting ERM. The 
increased use of ERM compared to the GM study suggests a greater acceptance of ERM 
between 2005 and 2007. 
Insert Table V about here 
Current and Ideal Responsibility for ERM Roles 
To answer Research Questions 2 and 3, respondents were asked to indicate on a 
five-point scale the extent of their current responsibility and what they perceive to be the 
ideal responsibility with respect to the various roles of internal audit in ERM listed in 
Table I. As noted, the IIA (2004a) classifies the roles as core, legitimate with safeguards, 
and those that internal audit should not perform.  To facilitate comparison between the 
findings of the present study and those of GM, we present both sets of results in Table 
VI.  
Insert Table VI about here 
Core Internal Auditing Roles in ERM 
In relation to the core roles for internal audit in ERM, they appear to have 
increased slightly in terms of current responsibility, with the exception of ‘evaluating the 
reporting of risks’. The ideal responsibility for each of these roles has also increased. The 
differences between the two studies could be due to a number of factors: greater 
awareness of internal audit’s role in ERM, greater responsibility due to the time 
difference between the two samples, or just differences in the populations.[4]  
These roles are considered core as they are the traditional internal audit roles of 
assurance. However, the current responsibility of the respondents falls between moderate 
and substantial. In these core roles it is acceptable for internal audit to have higher 
responsibility (IIA, 2004a) and hence there is room to further utilise internal audit in 
relation to these roles.  
Legitimate Internal Auditing Roles  
Legitimate roles are those the IIA has deemed internal audit can undertake, as 
long as there are safeguards in place to prevent any compromise of independence. These 
roles extend beyond the regular assurance activities into the consulting role of internal 
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audit (IIA, 2004a). In both the present study and the GM study, the current and ideal 
responsibilities range from limited to just over moderate, which is consistent with IIA 
guidance (IIA, 2004a). With the exception of two roles, the current responsibility of 
internal auditors in these areas has decreased compared to the GM study. There has also 
been a reduction in the perceived ideal responsibility for all legitimate roles. Thus, 
practice in this area would appear to be in line with IIA guidance.  
 
ERM Roles Internal Auditing Should Not Undertake 
The IIA sets out six roles that internal auditors should not undertake in ERM as 
they raise significant threats to objectivity (IIA, 2004a). In both studies, internal auditors 
indicate that they have some responsibility for these roles. In the GM study, the 
responsibility was generally around point 2 on the scale, indicating limited responsibility. 
In the present study, all areas of responsibility have decreased with the exception of 
‘providing management assurance on risks’. This particular role increased to over 
moderate for both current and ideal responsibility. This result is most probably due to 
confusion over the wording of the role. The provision of assurance is a traditional audit 
role and it is likely the respondents misinterpreted this role as just providing assurance. 
The other responsibilities all decreased compared to the GM study, which could again 
indicate a greater awareness of internal audit’s role in ERM. However, the fact that there 
is any responsibility in these areas is cause for some concern. 
 
Conclusion   
In this study, we explore the impact of internal audit involvement in ERM on 
internal auditors’ willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures to the audit 
committee.  We also explore whether the strength of the relationship with the audit 
committee affects the willingness to report. The study manipulated these two independent 
variables at two levels, resulting in a 2 x 2 between subjects factorial design. Participants 
in the experiment were members of the IIA who were Certified Internal Auditors. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that internal auditors would be less willing to report when their 
involvement in ERM is high. This hypothesis was strongly supported and was also robust 
to sensitivity analyses. This result suggests that internal auditors perceive that extensive 
involvement in ERM has a negative impact on objectivity.  
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that internal auditors would be more willing to report to 
the audit committee when their relationship with the audit committee is strong compared 
to when the relationship is weaker. We found no support for the predicted relationship. 
Further, no significant interaction effect was found between the two independent 
variables, suggesting that willingness to report to the audit committee when the 
relationship is strong is not dependent on the level of ERM involvement. 
There are a number of limitations that should be borne in mind when interpreting 
the experimental results reported in the study. First, we did not undertake a controlled 
experiment as it was not practical to get internal auditors together in a single location. 
Hence, the loss of control resulting from the use of a mail questionnaire may threaten the 
internal validity of the study.  Second, there are external validity threats associated with 
the sampling procedure, which limit the generalisability of results. All participants were 
members of the IIA, holding a Certified Internal Auditor qualification. Previous research 
has indicated that IIA membership itself can promote objectivity (Harrell et al., 1989). 
Hence, it is possible that the participants in this study have higher standards of objectivity 
than the general internal audit population. The sample was also drawn only from 
Australian internal auditors and hence the results may not hold in other jurisdictions. 
Third, our failure to obtain a result for the audit committee variable could be because we 
manipulated both strength of the audit committee and strength of the internal audit-audit 
committee relationship as a single construct. Fourth, our sample comprised internal 
auditors from both the public and private sectors (58% and 42% respectively) and this 
could have influenced our results, particularly with respect to the audit committee 
variable.  Fifth, the experiment measured the perceptions of internal auditors with respect 
to objectivity. As such, we have not tested whether actual objectivity is impaired when 
internal auditors are involved in ERM. Finally, ERM involvement was manipulated 
dichotomously in our study. However, the IIA has identified three levels of ERM roles 
for internal auditors (see Table I). Hence, it may have been more realistic to include the 
three levels within the scenario. Overcoming each of these limitations provides 
opportunities for further research.  
The study also provides descriptive evidence of the current status of ERM in 
organisations and the current and perceived ideal roles of internal audit in ERM. We 
make direct comparisons with the results of GM. Our findings indicate that ERM is more 
widely used than in the GM study and that internal auditors appear to be somewhat more 
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aware of the appropriate roles that they can play in ERM.  While we acknowledge the 
generalisability limitations associated with these results, they do suggest an increased 
awareness of the IIA guidelines with respect to involvement in ERM since the GM study 
as well as providing an indication of current practice in Australia.  
The study makes an important contribution to our understanding of the impact of 
involvement in ERM on internal audit objectivity and of the current role of internal audit 
in ERM in Australia. Our findings reinforce the need for organisations to adhere to the 
recommendations of the IIA and to ensure that internal auditors do not play an 
inappropriate role in ERM. They also highlight the dangers of internal auditors 
undertaking consulting roles that may compromise their objectivity. Finding the right 
balance between consultancy and assurance services with respect to ERM remains a 
challenge both for the internal audit profession and for managements and boards that rely 
on internal audit services.   
In addition to the research opportunities arising from the limitations of the present 
study, there are several suggestions for future research. Research could explore the 
perceptions of other governance parties such as audit committee members, management 
and external auditors with respect to internal audit’s involvement in ERM. In particular, 
the impact of internal audit’s involvement in ERM on external auditors’ reliance on the 
work of internal audit is an important avenue for further research.  Finally, the study 
showed that internal auditors believed that, regardless of its composition and diligence, 
the audit committee would be unlikely to detect a breakdown in non-financial risk 
procedures.  Identifying factors that would strengthen the audit committee’s ability to 
identify weaknesses in risk management is also an important avenue for future research.  
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Appendix:  Experimental Manipulations – Extracts from Research Instruments 
 
1. High Involvement in ERM 
 
“Tim has been a champion of the establishment of ERM and was instrumental in 
developing the overall risk management strategy for board approval. While Sam Dunn was 
hired 18 months ago as the Risk Officer to oversee the implementation of the ERM 
system, Tim continues to direct many of the ERM related activities. Sam has a direct 
reporting line to the General Manager, but tends to work closely with Tim. Most of the 
workshops on risk identification and assessment are still run by Tim, and he is a popular 
coach for helping managers identify and respond to risks. Further, Sam often seeks Tim’s 
help in setting up risk identification mechanisms, risk prioritisation guidelines and 
evaluation processes. For instance, Tim not only evaluated a newly acquired computerised 
risk assessment toolkit for use in the contract specifications area but also directed Sam on 
the types of risk procedures to be adopted. In particular, he was insistent that Sam adopt 
several less costly risk procedures.” 
 
2.  Low Involvement in ERM 
 
“Presently there is a separate risk management function within the organisation. Sam Dunn 
has been hired as the Chief Risk Manager to oversee the implementation of the ERM system 
and has three other staff supporting him. He reports directly to the General Manager and 
often liaises with Tim who, as the Chief Internal Auditor, undertakes regular evaluations and 
reports on the risks identified and the management of such risks. Where appropriate, Sam will 
refer to the internal audit’s evaluation report on risk management. For example, Tim’s 
evaluation report on a newly acquired computerised risk assessment toolkit for use in the 
contract specification area has helped Sam identify the types of risk procedures to be adopted 
in the area. However, the General Manager and Sam make the final decisions on the selection 
of all risk procedures and the implementation of all ERM processes.” 
 
3.  Stronger Audit Committee Characteristics and Relationship with Internal Audit 
 
“Alpha has an audit committee entirely comprised of independent members. Of the 4 
committee members, 3 have considerable financial expertise and 2 have extensive industry 
expertise. The committee meets at least 6 times throughout the year with management, and 
with the external and internal auditors. After the meetings the committee sets aside time to 
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meet privately with the Chief Internal Auditor and the external auditor. The audit committee 
has oversight responsibility for the internal audit function, and is actively involved with any 
appointment, dismissal and compensation for internal auditors. They also diligently follow up 
on all matters that are raised in the internal audit reports.” 
 
4.  Weaker Audit Committee Characteristics and Relationship with Internal Audit 
 
“Alpha has an audit committee comprised of a majority of independent members. Of the four 
committee members, one has some financial and industry expertise. The committee meets 
twice a year with management, and the external and internal auditors. However, the audit 
committee has not held any private meetings with the auditors to date. Further, although the 
audit committee reviews the internal audit reports, the committee generally leaves it to the 
Chief Internal Auditor to follow-up on recommendations. While the audit committee has 
responsibility over internal audit staffing and budgetary issues, the committee tends to let the 
General Manager handle such matters.” 
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Table I. 
Roles of internal audit in enterprise risk management (ERM) 
Core Internal Auditing Roles in ERM 
 Giving assurance on risk management processes 
 Giving assurance that risks are correctly evaluated 
 Evaluating risk management processes 
 Evaluating the reporting of risks 
 Reviewing the management of key risks 
Legitimate internal auditing roles with safeguards 
 Facilitating identification and evaluation of risks 
 Coaching management in responding to risks 
 Coordinating ERM activities 
 Consolidating the reporting on risks 
 Maintaining and developing the ERM framework 
 Championing establishment of ERM 
 Developing risk management strategy for board approval 
Roles internal auditing should not undertake 
 Setting the risk appetite 
 Imposing risk management processes 
 Management assurance on risks 
 Taking decisions on risk responses 
 Implementing risk responses on management’s behalf 
 Accountability for risk management 
Source: IIA (2004) 
 
 
  
 26
Table II. 
Background of participants 
Age (n = 116) 
Age groups: 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56+ 
                  Count 0 8 34 58 16 
                  Percentage 0.00% 6.90% 29.31% 50.00% 13.79%
Experience (n = 117) 
 Mean St. Dev Median Min. Max. 
Length of time in current organisation 
(years) 
6.78 5.76 5 0 26 
Length of time as an internal auditor 
(years) 
12.59 7.59 13 0 33 
Length of time as a member of the 
IIA (years) 
9.33 6.70 7.5 0.5 27 
Percentage prior management 
experience 
Prior Experience 
88.03% 
No Experience 
11.97% 
Sector employed Public Sector 
58.12% 
Private Sector 
41.88% 
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Table III. 
Manipulation checks 
Panel A – Involvement in ERM 
 High  Low    
 Mean 
(s.d.) 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
t Sig. 
Chief internal auditor’s influence 
on risk officer’s decisions 
7.85 
(1.035) 
5.65 
(1.536) 
-9.194 
 
.001 
Chief internal auditor’s 
involvement in ERM 
7.74 
(1.262) 
5.14 
(1.712) 
-9.423 .001 
Panel B – Audit committee 
 Stronger Weaker   
 Mean 
(s.d.) 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
t Sig. 
Strength of the audit committee 7.72 
(1.056) 
4.33 
(1.839) 
-12.197 .001 
Oversight ability of the audit 
committee 
7.21 
(1.519) 
3.56 
(1.452) 
-13.153 .001 
Likelihood the Audit Committee 
would detect the breakdown 
3.83 
(2.257) 
3.32 
(2.374) 
-1.180 .240 
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Table IV. 
The likelihood of disclosure to the audit committee 
Panel A: Means (Std. Deviations) and Cell Sizes 
 High Involvement in ERM 
Low Involvement 
in ERM Overall 
Stronger Audit Committee 
Relationship 
5.32 
(2.57) 
n = 22 
7.11 
(1.82) 
n = 36 
6.43 
(2.29) 
n = 58 
Weaker Audit Committee 
Relationship 
5.06 
(2.56) 
n = 32 
7.30 
(1.51) 
n = 27 
6.08 
(2.41) 
n = 59 
Overall 5.17 
(2.55) 
n = 54 
7.19 
(1.68) 
n = 63 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Source of variation Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
Corrected model 120.475 3 40.158 8.763 .000
Intercept 4341.804 1 4341.804 947.456 .000
ERM involvement (IV1) 114.575 1 114.575 25.002 .000
Audit committee relationship 
(IV2) 
0.035 1 0.035 .008 .930
Interaction 1.373 1 1.373 .300 .585
Error 517.833 113 4.583  
Total 5218.000 117  
Corrected total 638.308 116  
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Table V. 
ERM status in respondents’ organisations (%) 
 
ERM Status 
This Study 
n = 117 
GM 
n = 361 
The organisation has not considered ERM 10.3% 13.0% 
The organisation is currently considering the relevance of 
ERM for its enterprise 
12.8% 31.8% 
The organisation has recently adopted ERM, but 
implementation is not fully complete 
44.4% 36.6% 
The organisation has recently adopted ERM, and 
implementation is relatively mature 
17.1% 5.5% 
The organisation adopted ERM several years ago, and 
infrastructure is mature 
13.7% 6.1% 
The organisation has rejected ERM 0.0% 1.4% 
Other 0.9% 5.0% 
Response not provided 0.9% 0.6% 
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Table VI. 
Roles of internal audit in ERM * 
 Current 
Responsibility 
Ideal 
Responsibility 
 
 
ERM-related Activity 
This study 
n = 108 
Mean 
 (sd) 
GM** 
n = 361 
This study 
n = 108 
Mean 
 (sd) 
GM** 
n = 361 
Panel A: Core Internal Auditing Roles in ERM 
Giving assurance on risk management processes 3.71 
(0.99) 
3.10 4.05 
(0.72) 
3.80 
Giving assurance that risks are correctly evaluated 3.18 
(1.10) 
3.00 3.63 
(0.95) 
3.60 
Evaluating risk management processes 3.44 
(1.05) 
3.17 3.98 
(0.89) 
3.82 
Evaluating the reporting of risks 3.05 
(1.13) 
3.09 3.77 
(0.90) 
3.70 
Reviewing the management of key risks 3.39 
(1.13) 
3.19 3.95 
(0.82) 
3.76 
Panel B: Legitimate Internal Auditing Roles with Safeguards 
Facilitating identification and evaluation of risks 2.84 
(1.14) 
3.38 2.96 
(1.12) 
3.50 
Coaching management in responding to risks 2.66 
(1.14) 
2.84 2.81 
(1.10) 
3.11 
Coordinating ERM activities 2.30 
(1.43) 
2.47 2.19 
(1.22) 
2.75 
Consolidating the reporting on risks 2.39 
(1.47) 
2.87 2.32 
(1.29) 
3.10 
Maintaining and developing the ERM framework 2.30 
(1.50) 
2.49 2.17 
(1.20) 
2.73 
Championing establishment of ERM 
 
2.94 
(1.41) 
2.88 2.96 
(1.21) 
3.27 
Panel C: Roles Internal Auditing Should Not Undertake 
Setting the risk appetite 1.62 
(0.94) 
1.81 1.63 
(0.94) 
1.89 
Imposing risk management processes 1.97 
(1.13) 
2.19 1.83 
(0.97) 
2.30 
Management assurance on risks 3.04 
(1.33) 
2.41 3.17 
(1.38) 
2.64 
Taking decisions on risk responses 1.89 
(1.05) 
2.07 1.86 
(0.99) 
2.14 
Implementing risk responses on management’s 
behalf 
1.39 
(0.73) 
1.88 1.30 
(0.60) 
1.90 
Accountability for risk management 1.81 
(1.08) 
2.17 1.68 
(1.00) 
2.26 
*The scales ranged from 1 to 5 where: 1 = No responsibility, 2 = Limited responsibility, 3 = Moderate 
responsibility, 4 = Substantial responsibility, and 5 = Total responsibility. 
** The GM study did not give standard deviations. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Although global, approximately 90 per cent of the 361 responses were from North America. 
2 The findings from this section are not reported in this paper. 
3 Tests were undertaken for normality of distribution of the dependent variables by examining normality 
assumption histograms, normal Q-Q plots and detrended Q-Q. These tests indicated that both variables are 
normally distributed.   
4 As we do not have access to the raw data for the GM study, we are unable to test for statistically 
significant differences. 
